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1. INTRODUCTION 
Legal certainty IS a central tenet of the rule of law as 
understood around the world.! For example, the Foreign 
Ministers of the G82 declared in their meeting at Potsdam in 
2007 their nations' commitment to "the rule of law [as a] core 
principleD on which we build our partnership and our efforts to 
promote lasting peace, security, democracy and human rights as 
well as sustainable development worldwide."3 They stated that 
it is "imperative to adhere to the principleD ... of legal 
certainty."4 
While the United States is among the strongest proponents 
of the rule of law,5 American jurists do not speak of legal 
certainty-at least, not anymore.6 While the term "legal 
certainty" is English, it is not American English.7 American 
academics who address certainty of law use another term, "legal 
indeterminacy";S practicing lawyers by and large do not use 
either of these terms.9 Both groups of jurists seem resigned to 
ubiquitous uncertainty. 10 
1. See Danilo Zolo, The Rule of Law: A Critical Appraisal, in THE RULE OF LAW: 
HISTORY, THEORY AND CRITICISM 3, 24 (Pietro Costa & Danilo Zolo eds., 2007). Zolo seeks 
a uniform rule of law common to the four principal variations he sees in the rule of law-
the British, North American, German, and French. See id. at 7. 
2. Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States. University of Toronto GS Information Centre, What is the G8?, http:// 
www.gS.utoronto.ca/what_is_gS.html (last visited Oct. 26, 200S). 
3. GS Foreign Ministers, Declaration of GS Foreign Ministers on the Rule of Law 
(2007), http://www.gS.utoronto.calforeigniformin070530-law.pdf. [hereinafter GS 
Declaration]. 
4. Id.; accord The Rule of Law at the National and International Levels, G.A. Res. 
62170, U.N. Doc AlRES172170 (Dec. 6,2007). 
5. See James R. Maxeiner, Legal Certainty: A European Alternative to American 
Legal Indeterminacy?, 15 TUL. J. INT'L & COMPo L. 541, 545-46 (2007) [hereinafter 
Maxeiner, European Alternative to American Legal Indeterminacy]. 
6. See id. at 544. 
7. See id. at 543--45. 
S. See id. at 543--44. 
9. See id. 
10. See id. The term legal uncertainty has not, however, vanished from popular 
usage. See, e.g., Lisa Leff, California Gay-Marriage Ban Creates Legal Uncertainty, 
Assoc. PRESS, Nov. 7, 200S, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.coml200S!11107! 
california-gaymarriage-ba_n_142013.html. 
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The Secretary General of the United Nations wisely 
counseled, "a common understanding of key concepts is 
essential."ll Common efforts to build the rule of law have been 
"plagued" by "the failure of many policymakers to examine or 
fully understand the very concept of the 'rule oflaw."'12 How are 
we to build a partnership based on a concept on which we differ? 
This Article seeks to facilitate the international discussion of 
legal certainty and the rule of law. It aims: (I) to make 
Americans aware that skepticism of legal certainty espoused by 
American academics is atypical; (II) to make non-Americans 
aware of American skepticism of legal certainty; and (III) to help 
Americans and non-Americans alike understand each other 
better so that they may more efficiently cooperate.13 
11. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Rule of Law 
and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, "if 5, delivered to the 
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004) [hereinafter Rule of Law and 
Transitional Justice] (stating that concepts such as the rule of law "serve both to define 
our goals and to determine our methods"). 
12. JANE STROMSETH ET AL., CAN MIGHT MAKE RIGHTS? BUILDING THE RULE OF 
LAw AFTER MILITARY INTERVENTIONS 69 (2006) (emphasis omitted). 
13. Since the purpose of this Article is to better inform the international discussion 
of the rule of law at international and domestic legal system levels, it focuses on the 
practical and the attainable. It has limited goals. It is not concerned with fine 
distinctions in academic writings. If professional philosophers happen to read it, they 
may find no use for it. See Duncan Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 351, 354 
(1973) ("The professional philosopher, who has no understanding of the peculiar 
technical interests and needs of law, can see nothing in formalism but ... a clear 
derangement of the relationship between form and content." (quoting Rudolf von 
Jhering, 2 II Der Geist des romischen Rechts 478-79 (1883) (a. von Mehren trans.»). 
30 HOUSTON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LA W 
II. LEGAL CERTAINTY IS THE INTERNATIONAL 
BASIS OF THE RULE OF LAw 
[Vol. 31:1 
While at its outer bounds the rule of law may be "an 
essentially contested concept,"14 at its core, it promises legal 
certainty. 15 According to a recent publication of the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), " ... the concept first and foremost seeks to emphasize 
the necessity of establishing a rule-based society in the interest 
of legal certainty and predictability."16 
A legal system that provides legal certainty guides those 
subject to the law. 17 It permits those subject to the law to plan 
their lives with less uncertainty.18 It protects those subject to 
the law from arbitrary use of state power. 19 
The centrality of legal certainty to the thinking of 
continental jurists is not well appreciated by American 
academics captivated by legal indeterminacy.20 For the great 
German legal philosopher, Gustav Radbruch, legal certainty-
along with justice and policy-was . one of only three 
14. Neil MacCormick, Der Rechtsstaat und die Rule of Law, JURISTENZEITUNG, 
Jan. 1984, at 65, 65-66; Randall Peerenboom, Varieties of Rule of Law, an Introduction 
and Provisional Conclusion, in ASIAN DISCOURSES OF RULE OF LAW: THEORIES AND 
IMPLEMENTATION OF RULE OF LAw IN TWELVE ASIAN COUNTRIES, FRANCE AND THE U.S. 1 
(Randall Peerenboom ed., 2004); see also RONALD A. CASS, THE RULE OF LAw IN AMERICA 
1 (2001) ("'the rule of law' still means very different things to different people"). 
15. See, e.g., Gerhard Casper, Rule of Law? Whose Law? (Center on Democracy, 
Development, and the Rule of Law, Working Paper No. 10, 2004), reprinted in 
FESTSCHRIFT FUR ANDREAS HELDRICH ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG 1109 (Stephan Lorenz et al. 
eds., 2005); see also Danilo Zolo, supra note 1 (contending that a state must guarantee 
foreseeability in the law). 
16. DECD DEVELOPMENT AsSISTANCE COMMITTEE, ISSUES BRIEF: EQUAL ACCESS 
TO JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAw 2 (2005) [hereinafter DECD], http://www.oecd.org! 
dataoecdl26!51135785471.pdf. Enumerations of the requirements of the rule of law 
typically include legal certainty. See G8 Declaration, supra note 3; Rule of Law and 
Transitional Justice, supra note 11, ~ 5. 
17. See James R. Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy Made in America: U.S. Legal 
Methods and the Rule of Law, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 517, 522 (2006) [hereinafter Maxeiner, 
Legal Indeterminacy Made in America]. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
20. See id. at 520-23. 
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fundamental pillars of the very idea of law.21 Radbruch's 
contemporary, Ludwig Bendix, colorfully made the point in a 
way that scarcely permits forgetting: "[t]he concept of legal 
certainty is a central concept of [our] inherited legal methods, in 
which all have grown up[; i]t is the air in which all jurists have 
learned to breathe."22 Bendix was such a believer in legal 
certainty that, upon his release in May 1937 from the Nazi 
concentration camp at Dachau, he began to prepare a lawsuit 
against the camp's commandant.23 He surely would have 
brought the suit had his children not first hustled him out of the 
country to the safety of realist America.24 
Bendix was the truest of true believers, but commitment to 
legal certainty such as his is characteristic of European legal 
systems.25 Legal certainty is a "general principle of EC law."26 It 
is one of a handful of legal concepts so recognized by the 
European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human 
Rights. 27 It is a fundamental principle of the national legal 
systems of Europe:28 in Germany it is Rechtssicherheit,29 in 
21. Heather Leawoods, Gustav Radbruch: An Extraordinary Legal Philosopher, 2 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL'y 489,493 (2000). 
22. LUDWIG BENDIX, DAS PROBLEM DER RECHTSSICHERHEIT. ZUR EINFUHRUNG DES 
RELATIVISMUS IN DIE RECHTSANWENDUNGSLEHRE 2 (1914) (Author's translation). 
23. REINHARD BENDIX, FROM BERLIN TO BERKELEY, GERMAN-JEWISH IDENTITIES 
172 (1986). 
24. Id. 
25. See id.; LUDWIG BENDIX, supra note 22, at 2; see also JUHA RAITIO, THE 
PRINCIPLE OF LEGAL CERTAINTY IN EC LAw 125-30 (2003). 
26. RAITIO, supra note 25, at 125; see ANDREAS VON ARNAULD, 
RECHTSSICHTERHEIT: PERSPEKTIVISCHE ANNAHERUNGEN AN EINE IDEE DIRECTRICE DES 
RECHTS 661-62 (2006). 
27. See Patricia Popelier, Legal Certainty and Principles of Proper Law Making, 2 
EUR. J. L. REFORM 321, 327-28 (2000) (summarizing PATRICIA POPELIER, 
RECHTSZEKERHEID ALS BEGINSEL VAN BEHOORLIJKE REGELGEVING (1997»; RAITIO, supra 
note 25, at 125-30; TAKIS TRIDIMAS, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EU LAw 4 (2d 
ed. 2006). 
28. See RAITIO, supra note 25, at 125-36. 
29. Maxeiner, European Alternative to American Legal Indeterminacy, supra note 5 
at 551 nA9; see also VON ARNAULD, supra note 26 at 661-62 (2006). 
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France securite juridique,30 in Spain La seguridad juridica,31 in 
Italy certezza del diritto,32 in the Benelux countries rechtszeker-
heid,33 in Sweden rattssakerhet,34 in Poland do obowiq,zujqcego 
prawa,35 and in Finland oikeusuarmuuden periaate. 36 Legal 
certainty has even made its way back into English through the 
common law systems of the United Kingdom. 37 A legal system 
without a modicum of legal certainty is scarcely worthy of the 
name. 
As a general principle of European legal systems, legal 
certainty "requires that all law be sufficiently precise to allow 
the person-if need be, with appropriate advice-to foresee, to a 
degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences 
which a given action may entail."38 It means that: (1) laws and 
decisions must be made public; (2) laws and decisions must be 
definite and clear; (3) decisions of courts must be binding; (4) 
limitations on retroactivity of laws and decisions must be 
imposed; and (5) legitimate expectations must be protected.39 
Elsewhere I have shown at length how legal certainty is indeed 
heightened in one EU country, Germany.40 
30. Maxeiner, European Alternative to American Legal Indeterminacy, supra note 
5, at 551 n.48; see also RAITIO, supra note 25, at 128. 
31. Maxeiner, European Alternative to American Legal Indeterminacy, supra note 
5, at 551 n.52. 
32. Id. at 551 n.50. 
33. Id. at 550 n.47. 
34. Id. at 551 n.55. 
35. Id. at 551 n.53. 
36. Id. at 551 n.56. 
37. See RAITIO, supra note 25, at 127. 
38. Korchuganova v. Russia, No. 75039/01, Judgment, ~ 47 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 8, 
2006), available at httpi/cmiskp.echr.coe.intltkp197Iviewhbkm.asp?action=open&table=F69A27 
FD8F'B86142BFOICl166DEA398649&key=56853&sessionId=14913646&skin=hudoc-en&attach 
ment=true. 
39. See TRIDIMAS, supra note 27, at 242-57; VON ARNAULD, supra note 26, ch. 7.II 
(citing numerous decisions of the European Court of Justice and asserting tenets of legal 
certainty in European law). 
40. See Maxeiner, European Alternative to American Legal Indeterminacy, supra 
note 5, at 553-54. 
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III. "WE ARE ALL REALISTS Now" IS THE AMERICAN CREDO 
While jurists elsewhere in the world talk of legal certainty, 
in America they do not.41 While once American legal academics 
spoke of legal certainty, today they speak of legal 
indeterminacy.42 They reject legal certainty because they know 
better, or so they think. 43 Their credo is, "we are all realists 
now."44 
The "realists" were a loose group of mostly academic jurists 
in the United States in the 1920s and 1930s who critiqued what 
they saw as the prevailing "formalist" American legal system.45 
They thought judges judged without an accurate understanding 
of the way things actually were.46 When American jurists today 
say "we are all realists now," they mean that contemporary 
American lawyers work with "a full awareness of the limitations 
and flaws in the law and the complexity and openness of judicial 
decision making."47 
Sophisticated American jurists today no longer believe in 
legal certainty as an attainable or even desirable goa1.48 
According to Professors Jules Coleman and Brian Leiter, "only 
ordinary citizens, some jurisprudes, and first year law students 
41. See id. at 601 (noting a belief that "wholesale indeterminacy is an inevitable 
feature of modern legal systems"). 
42. Id. at 543-44. 
43. Id. at 544. 
44. Stephen A. Smith, Taking Law Seriously, 50 U. TORONTO L.J. 241, 247 (2000) 
("The slogan 'we are all realists now' is so well-accepted in North America-in particular 
in the United States-that an unstated working assumption of most legal academics is 
that judicial explanations of a judgment tell us little if anything about why a case was 
decided as it was."). 
45. Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 
44 HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1223-35 (1931). 
46. See id. at 1236-37. 
47. Smith, supra note 44, at 247; Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Realism of the 
''Formalist'' Age, in ST. JOHN'S UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH 
PAPER SERIES 1, 8 (2007), available at http://ssrn.comlabstract=985083. 
48. Maxeiner, European Alternative to American Legal Indeterminacy, supra note 
5, at 543-44. 
34 HOUSTON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LA W [Vol. 31:1 
have a working conception of law as determinate."49 Many 
American jurists regard legal certainty as a chimera, an 
infantile longing, a childhood belief that one gets over, just as 
one gets over belief in Santa Claus or the Wizard of Oz. 50 In 
their assessment, they hearken back to the opinion of Judge 
Jerome Frank, the noted realist, who in his 1930 book Law and 
the Modern Mind challenged the idea that legal decisions are 
always certain.51 Frank deprecated as a childish myth the idea 
that law could ever be certain. 52 His criticism was effective; by 
the 1960s the term "legal certainty" had fallen out of use. 53 
Ironically, most legal realists did not share Frank's extreme 
views of legal certainty. 54 They did not argue that judicial 
decisions are always uncertain. 55 Most did not even argue that 
judicial decisions are usually . uncertain. 56 Karl Llewellyn, 
perhaps the best known of the legal realists, agreed that law is 
not always certain, but did not agree that law is necessarily 
uncertain. 57 Indeed, as the principal drafter of the Uniform 
49. Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, Determinacy, Objectivity, and Authority, 142 
U. PA. L. REV. 549, 579 n.54 (1993). Much of the populace at large, however, clings to the 
idea of legal certainty. Vivian Grosswald Curran, Romantic Common Law, Enlightened 
Civil Law: Legal Uniformity and the Homogenization of the European Union, 7 COLUM. 
J. EUR. L. 63, 82 (2001). American law professors report that their first year law 
students must "un-learn" the idea that rules decide cases. Id. 
50. E.g., Craig M. Bradley, The Uncertainty Principle in the Supreme Court, 1986 
DUKE L.J. 1,63. 
51. Julius Paul, Jerome Frank's Attack on the "Myth" of Legal Certainty, 36 NEB. L. 
REV. 547, 547-49 (1957); see JEROME FRANK, LAw AND THE MODERN MIND 244 (1930) 
(asserting that legal certainty does not exist). 
52. Id. at 547; see also Wilfrid R. Rumble, American Legal Realism and the 
Reduction of Uncertainty, 13 J. PUB. L. 45, 45-46 (1964); Wilfrid R. Rumble, Rule-
Skepticism and the Role of the Judge: A Study of American Legal Realism, 15 J. PUB. L. 
251, 258-60 (1966) [hereinafter Rumble II]. 
53. See Rumble II, supra note 52, at 260. 
54. BRIAN LEITER, NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LEGAL 
REALISM AND NATURALISM IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 17 (2007). 
55. Id. at 19. 
56. Id. at 19-20. 
57. Karl Llewellyn, On Reading and Using the Newer Jurisprudence, 40 COLUM. L. 
REV. 581, 599 (1940) ("It does not show 'uncertainty' in the law .... What it shows is 
lack of 100 percent certainty, and that is all it shows."). 
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Commercial Code, America's most European piece of legislation, 
Llewellyn invested heavily in bringing certainty to American 
law. 58 
Yet today, three quarters of a century later, legal certainty 
has disappeared as a concept of the American legal system and 
as a goal to strive for; legal indeterminacy has become the 
common "conceptual terrain."59 The term "legal indeterminacy" 
in its present sense made its first appearances only in the 1960s 
and did not achieve currency until the 1980s, when a new group 
of legal academics, known as "crits" (from Critical Legal 
Studies), adopted it.60 Some of them endorsed the more radical 
position espoused by Frank that legal decisions are always 
uncertain.61 
Legal indeterminacy means that law does not always 
determine the answer to a legal question.62 According to the 
strongest version of the "indeterminacy thesis," known as 
"radical indeterminacy," law is always indefinite and never 
certain, any decision is legally justifiable in any case, and law is 
nothing more than politics by another name.63 Scholars quickly 
dispatched this point.64 
While few American jurists accept a strong version of 
indeterminacy, most academics, and perhaps most lawyers, 
believe m a weaker verSIOn sometimes termed 
58. See Richard E. Coulson, Private Law Codes and the Uniform Commercial 
Code-Comments on History, 27 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 615, 627 (identifying Professor 
Llewellyn as the chief reporter of the Uniform Commercial Code). 
59. LEITER, supra note 54, at 9. 
60. John Hasnas, Back to the Future: From Critical Legal Studies Forward to Legal 
Realism, or How Not to Miss the Point of the Indeterminacy Argument, 45 DUKE L.J. 84, 
85 (1995). 
61. LEITER, supra note 54, at 15, 17 (speaking of "Frankification" of realism). 
62. Maxeiner, European Alternative to American Legal Indeterminacy, supra note 
5, at 543. 
63. Id. 
64. See Ken Kress, Legal Indeterminacy, 77 CAL. L. REV. 283, 283 (1989); Lawrence 
B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 
462, 462 (1987) [hereinafter Indeterminacy Crisis); Lawrence B. Solum, Indeterminacy, 
in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 488 (Dennis Patterson ed., 
1996) (summarizing and challenging the "radical indeterminacy" argument). 
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"underdeterminacy."65 Underdeterminacy means that while the 
law constrains judicial decision, it does not uniquely determine 
it. 66 
This does not seem to be a particular advance on what 
Llewellyn and other Americans-including this Author relying 
on Llewellyn-said decades ago. 67 To jurists schooled in civil law 
methods, it is quite unremarkable. Karl Engisch, in his classic 
work on legal method, wrote long ago that binding to a statute 
"will always be a question of more or less."68 
Legal certainty and legal indeterminacy are not 
complements.69 Legal indeterminacy as a legal proposition has 
narrower application than does legal certainty.70 As far as 
individuals are concerned, legal certainty serves two distinct 
functions: it guides them in complying with the law, and it 
protects them against arbitrary government action by 
controlling the use of the power to make and apply law.71 
65. See, e.g., Indeterminacy Crisis, supra note 64; Lee J. Strang, An Originalist 
Theory of Precedent: Originalism, Nonoriginalist Precedent, and the Common Good, 36 
N.M. L. REV. 419 (2006); Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon 036: Indeterminacy, 
http://lsolum.typepad.comllegal_theory _lexiconl2004/05llegaLtheory _le_2.h tml (last 
visited Oct. 26, 2008). 
66. According to Lawrence B. Solum: 
[1] The law is determinate with respect to a given case if and only if the set 
of legally acceptable outcomes contains one and only one member. [2] The 
law is underdeterminate with respect to a given case if and only if the set of 
legally acceptable outcomes is a nonidentical subset of the set of all possible 
results. [3] The law is indeterminate with respect to a given case if the set of 
legally acceptable outcomes is identical with the set of all possible results. 
Solum, supra note 65. 
67. Llewellyn, supra note 57; JAMES MAXEINER, POLICY AND METHODS IN GERMAN 
AND AMERICAN ANTITRUST LAw: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 28 (1986) [hereinafter 
MAxEINER, POLICY AND METHODS] (speaking of "negative" and "positive" binding). 
68. KARL ENGISCH, EINFUHRUNG IN DAS JURISTISCHE DENKEN 136 (1st ed. 1956) 
("Es wird sich immer nur urn die Frage des mehr oder Minder der Bindung an das 
Gesetz handeln."). 
69. See Maxeiner, European Alternative to American Legal Indeterminacy, supra 
note 5, at 601. 
70. See Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy Made in America, supra note 17, at 552. 
71. See MAxEINER, POLICY AND METHODS, supra note 67, at 10-11. 
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American legal indeterminacy is concerned principally only with 
the latter;72 it is interested in the former only incidentally in 
that it is concerned with predicting appellate decisions. 73 
Legal indeterminacy is principally a theory of appellate 
judicial decision making. 74 It assumes the perspective of 
appellate judges. 75 By focusing on whether rules require 
appellate judges to reach particular correct answers, the 
American discussion of legal indeterminacy overstates the level 
of uncertainty and underestimates opportunities for decreasing 
it.76 
Controlling appellate decisions is only one concern of legal 
certainty.77 Legal certainty is concerned more generally with 
controlling legal decisions of all types,78 and more broadly still, 
with guiding persons subject to law. 79 Perfect precision is not 
essential for substantial fulfillment of the guidance function. 8o 
Legal certainty thus includes the perspective of law abiding 
subjects as well as that oflaw appliers.81 
These different concerns mean that there is no inverse 
correlation between legal certainty and legal indeterminacy.82 A 
high level of legal certainty can be consistent with a high level of 
legal indeterminacy.83 For example, judicial decisions may be 
72. See id. 
73. See id. 
74. See LEITER, supra note 54, at 19-20. Leiter makes the point that the realists 
focused on appellate decision making. Id. Since then, many American jurists have used 
indeterminacy with respect to judicial decisions generally. See Chris Guthrie et aI., 
Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 2 (2007). The 
American study of law emphasizes judicial decision making and, in particular, appellate 
decision making. See id. at 3-4. 
75. See, e.g., E.W. THOMAS, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS: REALISM, PRAGMATISM, 
PRACTICAL REASONING AND PRINCIPLES 108-09 (2005). 
76. See Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy Made in America, supra note 17, at 523. 
77. See MAxEINER, POLICY AND METHODS, supra note 67, at 10-12. 
78. Maxeiner, European Alternative to American Legal Indeterminacy, supra note 
5, at 546. 
79. Id. at 11 (noting how German law distinguishes Orientierungs from 
Realisierungssicherheit) . 
80. Id. at 11-12. 
81. See Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy Made in America, supra note 17, at 524. 
82. LEITER, supra note 54, at 60. 
83. See id. 
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certain, even though they are subject to little control, if who the 
decision maker is, is certain and that decision maker for reasons 
external to legal rules decides predictably.84 Or judicial 
decisions may be sufficiently certain for guidance purposes, if 
the grounds for their invocation or if their consequences are 
clearly constrained.85 
IV. LEGAL CERTAINTY AS LEITMOTIF FOR LEGAL METHODS 
The importance of legal certainty transcends that of its 
constituent rules and principles.86 It is, as Andreas von Arnauld 
has said, an "idee-directrice" or "Leitgedanke," that is, a guiding 
idea or leitmotif for the entire legal system.87 The extent and the 
manner in which it is incorporated into positive law varies from 
system to system, but its realization in some form is essential to 
individual autonomy.88 Its importance derives less from 
providing an independent basis for reviewing legal decision (its 
sub-principles provide that basis) and more from being an 
omnipresent guiding idea protecting personal autonomy.89 Long 
before individual decisions are reached, legal certainty is a 
consideration in how those decisions will be made.9o Legal 
certainty is central to the creation of the legal methods by which 
law is made, interpreted, and applied.91 Legal indeterminacy 
cannot and does not have the same guiding function that legal 
certainty has. 92 When indeterminacy is expected and even 
embraced, rules recede in importance.93 Some American 
academics put in their place process.94 Their idea is, if we are 
84. Leiter speaks of decisions that may not be "rationally Ddeterminate" but are 
"causally determinate." Id. at 9. 
85. See MAXEINER, POLICY AND METHODS, supra note 67, at 26--27 (speaking of 
"negative binding"). 
86. VON ARNAULD, supra note 26, at 661-64. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. at 662-64,691-92. 
89. See Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy Made in America, supra note 17, at 523--25. 
90. See MAXEINER, POLICY AND METHODS, supra note 67, at 11. 
91. Id. at 10-11. 
92. See Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy Made in America, supra note 17, at 552 
(explaining the differences in effect between certainty and indeterminacy). 
93. Id. 
94. Id. 
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unable to guarantee a decision according to law, i.e., according 
to legal rules, at least we can guarantee a decision according to a 
lawful process.95 
The legal indeterminacy thesis is not, however, the cause of 
this development. The thesis has achieved acceptance because 
American law is uncertain.96 American legal methods function 
less well than do their foreign counterparts.97 
Space does not allow more than ticking off some of the more 
prominent legal certainty-enhancing methods that are routine in 
other legal systems, but are deficient or lacking in the American. 
Many of these methods were once subjects of protracted and 
mostly unsuccessful American law reform efforts.98 
A. Lawmaking 
1. Legal Rules are Syllogistic Norms; They Determine Their 
Consequences and Who May Invoke and Apply Them. 99 
Legal rules guide people's actions and judges' 
decisions. 100 Legal norms prescribe particular outcomes 
when generally described states of fact are present. lOl 
While legal rules cannot always be precise and definite, 
and while they cannot always exclude judgment and 
discretion in their application and enforcement, they 
. can always state who may invoke them, who may apply 
them, and what the consequences of application may 
be. l02 
95. Id. at 525-26, 552. 
96. See id. at 518. 
97. See Maxeiner, European Alternative to American Legal Indeterminacy, supra 
note 5, at 605-06. 
98. Id. at 587. 
99. Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy Made in America, supra note 17, at 555, 573. 
100. Maxeiner, European Alternative to American Legal Indeterminacy, supra note 
5, at 524. 
101. Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy Made in America, supra note 17, at 556. 
102. Id. at 559. 
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2. Legal Rules are Consistent and Coordinated with Other 
Legal Rules. 103 
Legal rules are internally consistent. l04 They are 
routinely coordinated with other legal rules of the same 
jurisdiction and with rules of other jurisdictions. 105 
3. Authority to Make and Apply Legal Rules is Bestowed 
Guardedly. 106 
Government presents a single face to citizens on most 
legal questions. l07 Law abiding people need not choose 
which of the government's rules to comply with or 
which of the government's courts to petition. l08 Federal 
and state governments coordinate their legislation, 
administration, and adjudication well. 109 State 
governments control the limited lawmaking authority 
they allow local governments. 110 
4. Legal Rules are Impartially Prepared in a Professional 
Process. 111 
Formal systems for lawmaking improve legislation 
quality and reduce opportunities for special interest 
and amateur influence in legislative drafting. 112 




106. Id. at 602. 
107. Id.; Maxeiner, European Alternative to American Legal Indeterminacy, supra 
note 5, at 522. 
108. Maxeiner, European Alternative to American Legal Indeterminacy, supra note 
5, at 559-64. 
109. Id. at 574. 
110. Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy Made in America, supra note 17, at 599. 
111. Maxeiner, European Alternative to American Legal Indeterminacy, supra note 
5, at 532; OECD, supra note 16, at 2. 
112. Maxeiner, European Alternative to American Legal Indeterminacy, supra note 
5, at 532. 
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having professional competence in the field. 113 It is 
routinely subject to intergovernmental vetting before 
adoption by the legislature.114 
B. Law Finding and Judicial Lawmaking 
5. Judges Know the Legal Rules.115 
Judges know the law; the maxim jura 
applies.116 Courts ordinarily spend 




6. Judges Do Not See Their Job as Routinely Making New 
Legal Rules.118 
Even in modern legal systems, not all law IS 
statutory;119 judge-made law is necessary.120 But III 
most modern legal systems, judge-made law is 
exceptional; judges do not see making law as a routine 
part, let alone as the essence, of their jobs.121 
113. Id. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. at 536 (describing the way in which judges find the appropriate rules). 
116. Except in England. See F.A. Mann, Fusion of the Legal Professions?, 93 LAw 
Q. REV. 367, 369 (1977). 
117. See id. at 369-70 (arguing that in the English and Irish systems the law has 
little to do with legal decision making). 
118. Maxeiner, European Alternative to American Legal Indeterminacy, supra note 
5, at 534-35; Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy Made in America, supra note 17, at 562. 
119. Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy Made in America, supra note 17, at 534. 
120. Id. at 535. 
121. Maxeiner, European Alternative to American Legal Indeterminacy, supra note 
5, at 534-35. 
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C. Law Applying 
7. Professional Judges Apply Legal Rules to Facts. 122 
Judges are professionals. 123 They are trained to be 
judges.124 
8. Applying Legal Rules to Facts Is the Principal Goal of 
Legal Procedure;125 It Requires Written Justification. 126 
There are routine methods for applying rules to facts 
that make it possible for others, namely participants 
and reviewing courts, to reproduce the process of 
decision. 127 Participants are entitled to justified 
decisions that rationally relate legal decisions to 
substantive law.128 
9. Courts Take Evidence Only on Material, Disputed 
Facts. 129 
Rules by their nature single out certain facts as 
determinative (material elements) and exclude other 
facts from consideration. 130 Courts ordinarily take 
evidence only on factual questions that are both 
material and disputed.131 
122. James R. Maxeiner, Guiding Litigation: Applying Law to Facts in Germany 
(Common Good Forum, The Boundaries of Litigation: A Forum Addressing the 
Alignment of Civil Justice with Social Goals, Washington, D.C., Apr. 15, 2008), available 
at http://ssrn.comlabstract=1230453; MAXEINER, POLICY AND METHODS, supra 
note 67, at 83. 
123. Ric Simmons, Re-Examining the Grand Jury: Is There Room for Democracy in 
the Criminal Justice System?, 82 B.U. L. REV. 1,61 (2002). 
124. Id. 
125. Maxeiner, European Alternative to American Legal Indeterminacy, supra note 
5, at 558. 
126. MAXEINER, POLICY AND METHODS, supra note 67, at 86. 
127. Id.; Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy Made in America, supra note 17, at 604. 
128. Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy Made in America, supra note 17, at 604; 
OECD, supra note 16, at 2. 
129. Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy Made in America, supra note 17, at 604. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. 
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*** 
What most American academics overlook is that American 
jurists, from the adoption of the Constitution through at least 
the era of the realists in the 1920s, sought-largely 
unsuccessfully-to abandon old and uncertain common law 
methods and substitute more modern certainty enhancing 
methods along the lines just mentioned. 132 
The legal indeterminacy thesis-accepting the "we are all 
realists" credo--validates a collective abandonment of legal 
certainty as a legitimate goal of the legal system. 
Ask an American legal academic what happened to legal 
certainty, and he or she is likely to answer, "the law has always 
been uncertain and it always will be uncertain."133 Protest that 
this is not so on the Continent and the American academic likely 
will suggest-politely-that Europeans are deluding 
themselves. 134 Persist, and claim that there is greater legal 
certainty in Europe, and the American academic will express 
skepticism that this is so and will demand empirical proof.135 
Provide the proof and the American academic will insist that 
there are higher values than legal certainty and that the 
American legal system prefers those values. 136 Finally, question 
132. See generally Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy Made in America, supra note 17 
(tracing the development of legal indeterminacy in American law). For a refreshing 
exception, see Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Bogus Tale About the Legal Formalists (St. John's 
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 08-0130, 2008), available at http://ssrn.comlabstract 
=1123498. 
133. See THOMAS, supra note 75, at 115-16. These words are actually those of a 
New Zealand judge, but many American legal academics might have uttered them. Id. 
134. See id. at 116. 
135. E.g., Robert Allen et aI., The German Advantage in Civil Procedure: A Plea for 
More Details and Fewer Generalities in Comparative Scholarship, 82 Nw_ U. L. REV. 705, 
708, 761-62 (1988) (challenging the superiority of the German litigation system and 
calling for an empirical analysis of the respective approaches to civil procedure, experts, 
and qualification of judges). But see Maxeiner, Guiding Litigation, supra note 122 
(demonstrating advantages of the German system in applying law). 
136. Cf Samuel R. Gross, The American Advantage: The Value of Inefficient 
Litigation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 734, 742-47 (1988) (standing for the proposition that the 
American legal system may sacrifice efficiency in order to attain other goals such as 
superior accuracy, promoting citizens' confidence, and respect for individual autonomy); 
see also Howard Bernstein, Whose Advantage After All?, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 587, 599 
(1988). The opponents of codification made similar arguments. See JAMES COOLIDGE 
CARTER, THE PROPOSED CODIFICATION OF OUR COMMON LAw (1884), reprinted in THE 
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whether the American system really accomplishes those aims, 
and the American academic will say that it does not really 
matter, since the United States probably could not ever adopt 
legal methods that produce legal certainty.137 
Widespread acceptance of the legal indeterminacy thesis-
even in a less than radical form-has called into question in the 
United States the utility of rules as parts of solutions to social 
problems.138 It has led to resignation. 139 According to Professor 
Pierre Schlag and his colleagues, "a great many leading 
American legal thinkers have now mostly abandoned 'doing 
law."'140 Unable to overcome a problem, they want to move on to 
things that they can solve.14l Professor Michael Dorf says that 
there are more important things to worry about than justifying 
judicial lawmaking as law application. 142 Contemporary theory 
has reached, he says, a "dead end."143 
LIFE OF THE LAw, READINGS ON THE GROWTH OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 115, 118 (John 
Honnold ed., 1964) (explaining that unwritten law, best described as law that embraces 
the rights, obligations, and duties of both person and property, cannot be sufficiently 
codified in a scientific system of jurisprudence). 
137. C{ John Reitz, Why We Probably Cannot Adopt the German Advantage in 
Civil Procedure, 75 IOWA L. REV. 987, 988 (1990) (discussing the impracticability of 
modeling the American legal system after the German system). 
138. See Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy Made in America, supra note 17, 
at 519--20. 
139. Id. 
140. PAUL E. CAMPOS ET AL., AGAINST THE LAw 1 (1996). 
141. Id. 
142. Michael Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
875,878-79 (2003). 
143. Id. at 876. 
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v. CONCLUSION: DEALING WITH EACH OTHER 
The insularity of the United States would not matter much 
if the United States were a minor power off on its own on a 
small island.144 But it is not.145 It projects its power-and its 
concepts-around the globe.146 The United States is world 
leader in promoting rule of law programs.147 So if its jurists 
have a peculiar view of the rule of law, they may-if only 
inadvertently-impose their view on others.148 In their dealings 
with others, and in the dealings of others with them, it behooves 
all to have an understanding of each others' underlying 
assumptions. How are we to accomplish that? 
My advice to non-American jurists: do not argue with 
American jurists about legal certainty; do not discuss legal 
indeterminacy. Do not even talk about the formal rule of law. 
Redirect the conversation. Instead of discussing legal certainty, 
talk about specifics. No American jurist will debate whether 
laws and decisions should be made public. Most will welcome 
discussing how judicial decisions can be made more definite and 
binding. Raise questions about how courts should limit 
retroactivity of laws and how they should protect legitimate 
expectations. From there you can go on to talk about how to 
draft better laws that can be more easily applied. 
My advice to American jurists: do talk about legal certainty. 
For a moment stop conversing about controlling judicial 
decisions. Take the perspective of ordinary people seeking to 
abide by law. Put aside, for one moment, whether you can 
predict judges' decisions. Remember that the vast majority of 
144. Adam Liptak, U.S. Court, a Longtime Beacon, Is Now Guiding Fewer Nations, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2008, at AI. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. 
147. American programs include: American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative 
(http://www.abanet.org/rol/), Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Democracy & 
Rule of Law (http://www.carnegieendowment.org/programs/globalJindex.cfm?fa=proj&id 
=101&proj=zdrl), and United States Institute of Peace, Rule of Law Program 
(http://www.usip.org/ruleoflaw/index.html). 
148. Cf Casper, supra note 15. 
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legal questions never come close to a judge's bench. Ask, as an 
eminent American jurist once did, does the law make "plain to 
the apprehension of the people what conduct on their part is 
forbidden"?149 Look to what other legal systems have to offer. 
The American system can learn from them. 150 
149. Thomas M. Cooley, The Uncertainty of the Law, 22 AM. L. REV. 347, 
355 (1888). 
150. See James R. Maxeiner, Learning from Others: Sustaining the 
Internationalization and Globalization of U.S. Law School Curriculums, 32 FORDHAM J. 
INT'L L. 501 (2008); Ernst C. Stiefel & James R. Maxeiner, Civil Justice Reform in the 
United States: Opportunity for Learning from Civilized European Procedure Instead of 
Continued Isolation?, 42AM.J.COMP.L 167 (1994); James R. Maxeiner, 1992: High Time For 
American Lawyers to Learn from Europe, or Roscoe Pound's 1906 Address Revisited, 
1991 FORDHAM I.L.J. 1. 
